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PROLOGUE 
[P]eculiar qualifications being essential in the members 
[of the judiciary], the primary consideration ought to be to 
select that mode of choice which best secures these 
qualifications.1 
–James Madison 
 
Under some constitutions the judges are elected and 
subject to frequent reelection. I venture to predict that 
sooner or later these innovations will have dire results and 
that one day it will be seen that by diminishing the 
magistrates’ independence, not judicial power only but the 
democratic republic itself has been attacked.2 
–Alexis de Tocqueville 
 
We are today witnessing a sad consequence of this 
subordination of this Supreme Court to the Legislature. . . . 
[The] Supreme Court Judges and, possibly, all judges, can 
be kept in attendance by the Legislature, hat in hand, so to 
speak, whenever it suits the purpose of some disgruntled 
representatives to snap the Court to attention with a bill to 
change the manner of their election. If this is not 
subordination, nothing is. . . . I say this Court has opened 
Pandora’s Box . . . .3 
–Hon. Allison B. Humphreys, 
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice 
 
The quality of judges and the manner of selecting them matters; 
this is a basic premise underpinning the rule of law in the United States. 
From the inception of the United States’ democratic system, the judiciary’s 
Damoclean Sword has been the threat of subrogation at the hands of the 
Legislature, and perhaps the easiest way to rattle the sword has been to 
legislatively interfere with judicial selection—whether by changing the 
manner of appointment or by simply refusing to fill vacancies. The 
comments above span the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, 
and today in Tennessee the proverbial horse’s hair has never seemed more 
precarious. 
                                                
 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 318 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans.) (1966) (emphasis supplied). 
 3. State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 494–95 (Tenn. 1973) (Humphreys, 
J., dissenting). 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL SELECTION IN TENNESSEE 
A. 2013—The State of Play of Judicial Selection in Tennessee 
On April 19, 2013, the 108th Tennessee General Assembly 
adjourned without passing any legislation regarding the Judicial 
Nominating Commission (“JNC”), which, as a result, ceased to exist 
effective June 30, 2013.4 
The JNC functioned as one half of the “Tennessee Plan”—a 
process for merit selection of judges in Tennessee—through which the 
Commission reviewed applications for vacancies occurring on the trial and 
appellate courts and submitted a slate of nominees to the governor for 
appointment. 
The General Assembly approved a constitutional amendment in the 
2013 legislative session5 that, if passed via statewide referendum in 
November 2014, will make the State’s appellate judges subject solely to 
gubernatorial appointment with legislative confirmation, followed by 
periodic retention elections.6 Should the constitutional amendment fail, 
however, then there is no clear mechanism for the appointment or election 
of judges. Most importantly, at this moment there is no clear mechanism to 
fill vacancies in the judiciary.7 
                                                
 4. The JNC was “sunset” beginning June 30, 2012, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-233, 
and its one-year “winding up” period provided by law, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-112 (2011), 
ended June 30, 2013. 
 5. Article XI, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that any proposed 
constitutional amendment must be agreed upon by the members of the house and senate in 
two consecutive sessions. The proposed constitutional amendment was propounded by 
Senate Joint Resolution 710 (2012) and Senate Joint Resolution 2 (2013). Letter from Alan 
Whittington, Deputy Chief Clerk (April 2, 2013) available at http://tnsos.org/acts/108/ 
resolutions/sjr0002.pdf. The amendment shall be effective “if the people shall approve and 
ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of all the citizens of the State voting for 
Governor.” TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 6. The proposed amendment of TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 reads: 
Judges of the Supreme Court or any intermediate appellate court shall be 
appointed for a full term or to fill a vacancy by and at the discretion of 
the governor; shall be confirmed by the Legislature; and thereafter, shall 
be elected in a retention election by the qualified voters of the state. 
Confirmation by default occurs if the Legislature fails to reject an 
appointee within sixty calendar days of either the date of appointment, if 
made during the annual legislative session, or the convening date of the 
next annual legislative session, if made out of session. The Legislature is 
authorized to prescribe such provisions as may be necessary to carry out 
Sections two and three of this article. 
 
S.J. Res. 2, 108th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013). 
 7. The State Constitution requires the Legislature to determine the manner for filling 
all vacancies not otherwise provided for in the constitution. Since the Legislature has sunset 
the Tennessee Plan without fulfilling its constitutional obligation to provide for a mechanism 
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The other half of the Tennessee Plan, the Judicial Performance 
Evaluation Commission (“Evaluation Commission”), was “sunset” 
beginning June 30, 2013.8 The Evaluation Commission is charged with 
“assist[ing] the public in evaluating the performance of incumbent appellate 
court judges”9 by producing public reports regarding judges standing for 
election.10 During its one-year “winding up” period, the Evaluation 
Commission will evaluate the appellate judges standing for election in 
August 2014.11 
By June 4, 2013—scarcely six weeks from the conclusion of the 
legislative session and amid the lack of certainty as to how to fill judicial 
vacancies—three intermediate appellate court judges announced that they 
would retire at the expiration of their terms on August 31, 2014. The JNC 
operated on an expedited timeframe in order to nominate replacements 
before it ceased operations on June 30, 2013. In fact, the JNC submitted 
two panels for each appellate vacancy, in case the Governor exercised his 
statutory right to reject the first panel and request another one.12 At the 
same time, the JNC was also busy addressing vacancies in four trial 
courts.13 
                                                                                                             
to fill vacancies in other courts, there is, in essence, no way to fill trial court level vacancies. 
See Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of the 
Story, 75 TENN. L. REV. 501, 526 (2008). It does not appear that the current proposed 
constitutional amendment addresses this inadequacy. See, e.g., What Would Happen if the 
Judicial Selection and Evaluation Commissions Sunset?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Civil Practice & Procedure, 106th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009) (statement of 
Prof. Brian Fitzpatrick, Vanderbilt Law School). 
 8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-234 (2013). 
 9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201 (2012). 
 10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(c) (2012). 
 11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-112; Telephone Interview with Aaron Conklin, Staff 
Contact for Evaluation Commission, Administrative Office of the Courts (Sept. 12, 2013). 
 12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112(a)(1) (2009). See also Nominating Commission 
Sends Eighteen Names to Governor Haslam This Week for Appeals Court Openings, 
TNCOURTS.GOV (June 29, 2013), http://www.tncourts.gov/news/2013/06/29/nominating-
commission-sends-18-names-gov-haslam-week-appeals-court-openings. The Governor made 
appointments to the Middle Section Court of Appeals, the Eastern Section Court of Criminal 
Appeals, and the Western Section Court of Appeals in late August 2013. Chancellor Goldin 
Appointed to Court of Appeals Seat in Western Section, TNCOURTS.GOV (AUG. 28, 2013), 
http://www.tncourts.gov/news/2013/08/28/chancellor-goldin-appointed-court-appeals-seat-
western-section; Haslam Appoints Judge Montgomery to Court of Criminal Appeals, 
TNCOURTS.GOV (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/news/2013/08/27/haslam-
appoints-judge-montgomery-court-criminal-appeals; McBrayer Appointed to Court of 
Appeals Middle Section, TNCOURTS.GOV (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.tncourts.gov/news/ 
2013/08/26/mcbrayer-appointed-court-appeals-middle-section. 
 13. See Mike Faulk Appointed Circuit Court Judge for Third District, TNCOURTS.GOV 
(June 27, 2013), http://www.tncourts.gov/news/2013/06/27/mike-faulk-appointed-circuit-
court-judge-3rd-district; Nominating Commission Selects Three Candidates in 30th District, 
TNCOURTS.GOV (March 27, 2013), http://www.tncourts.gov/news/2013/03/27/nominating-
commission-selects-3-candidates-30th-district; Three Names Sent to Governor for Chancery 
Court Vacancy in First Judicial District, TNCOURTS.GOV (June 14, 2013), http://www. 
tncourts.gov/node/1899508. 
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On June 26, 2013, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Janice M. 
Holder announced her retirement at the end of her current term, effective 
August 31, 2014. With this announcement timed four days before the end of 
the JNC, it became official that, absent legislative intervention, there would 
be a vacancy on the State’s highest court before the proposed constitutional 
amendment is voted upon, with no clear legal mechanism for replacement. 
On July 19, 2013, a Special Supreme Court14 heard argument in 
Hooker v. Haslam,15 a case challenging the constitutionality of the 
Tennessee Plan. The trial court in this case upheld the constitutionality of 
the statutes, but concluded that intermediate appellate judges are subject to 
retention election only by the qualified voters of the “Grand Division” in 
which the judge resides, rather than the statewide elections. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of the statutes and reversed the 
finding with respect to statewide elections, and the Supreme Court accepted 
the application for permission to appeal.16 
On October 9, 2013, Tennessee’s Attorney General issued an 
opinion that, despite the termination of the JNC, the Governor was still 
empowered to fill all judicial vacancies.17 The repealed Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 17-4-113(a) had allowed the Governor to make judicial appointments if 
the JNC did not act within sixty days to fill a vacancy. In the opinion, the 
Attorney General noted that, during the course of passing the JNC’s 
enabling legislation, an amendment had been proposed that would have 
explicitly reserved such authority to the governor in the event of sunset, but 
the amendment was withdrawn after comments from the floor indicating 
that it was not necessary.18 Given this legislative history, the Attorney 
                                                
 14. The moniker “Special Supreme Court” exists because each of the Justices who will 
preside over the case has been specially appointed by the governor to hear the matter. This is 
provided for via the Tennessee Constitution and by statute in cases in which a conflict of 
interest exists preventing a Supreme Court Justice from hearing a matter. See TENN. CONST. 
art. VI, § 11; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-102 (2014); see also Holder v. Tenn. Judicial 
Selection Comm’n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tenn. 1996). In Hooker v. Haslam, 393 S.W.3d 
156, 169–70 (Tenn. 2012), each elected Supreme Court Justice recused herself or himself 
ostensibly to avoid passing on the manner of his/her own appointment and election to the 
bench. The Special Supreme Court then reviewed and granted the application for permission 
to appeal, held oral argument, and will issue an opinion. Hooker v. Haslam, No. M2012-
01299-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. argued July 19, 2013). The judgment of the “Special Supreme 
Court” holds the absolute force of law. Holder v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 937 
S.W.2d at 881–82. 
 15. No. M2012-01299-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. argued July 19, 2013). 
 16. Please see the Postscript to this Article for more information on Hooker v. Haslam. 
 17. Authority of the Governor to Fill Judicial Vacancies, Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 13-76 
(Oct. 9, 2013), available at https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/op/2013/op13-076.pdf. 
 18. Senator Dewayne Bunch had proposed the amendment saying, “[t]he language that 
I have is drafted so that if this were to sunset in the future, that the authority . . . for the 
governor to appoint an interim would still exist.” S. 106-1573, 1st Sess., at 9–10 (Tenn. 
2009), available at https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/op/2013/op13-076.pdf. The 
amendment was withdrawn, however, after Senate Majority Leader Mark Norris stated his 
belief that it was unnecessary. Id. at 10. 
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General reasoned that the Governor could still use the statutory power in 
repealed Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-113(a) to make judicial appointments.19 
One week later, on October 17, 2013, Governor Bill Haslam issued 
an Executive Order creating the Governor’s Commission for Judicial 
Appointments (“Governor’s Commission”).20 Through the Order, the 
Governor essentially reinstated the JNC, adopting, almost verbatim, the text 
of the repealed statutes. Eleven members of the JNC whose terms were 
unexpired when the JNC terminated were appointed to the Governor’s 
Commission, and the Executive Order provided that the remaining spots 
would be filled by the Governor in consultation with the Speaker of the 
House and Speaker of the Senate. By its nature, the Executive Order is 
temporary; the terms of all members are set to expire on November 5, 
2014—the day the proposed constitutional amendment will be voted upon. 
The day after Governor Haslam reinstituted merit selection via 
Executive Order, Knoxville attorney Herbert Moncier filed suit in federal 
district court challenging the Governor’s Commission. Moncier alleged that 
he had a property right in seeking election to the Criminal Court of Appeals 
in August 2014 and that the existence of the Governor’s Commission 
denied him that right.21 
On October 31, 2013, the Tennessee Judicial Evaluation 
Commission released its preliminary reports of the judges slated to stand 
for election in 2014.22 Three judges were not recommended for retention. 
While the judges can respond to the preliminary recommendations in 
advance of the Commission’s final report, if the Commission ultimately 
recommends that a judge not be retained, then that judge’s seat is subject to 
a contested election. One judge has since announced that he will not seek 
reelection.23 
Thus, as of the drafting of this Article, the General Assembly has 
repealed all statutory mechanisms for appointing judges; the Attorney 
General has issued an opinion that the repeal has no effect on the 
Governor’s statutory power; the Governor has established his own interim 
Commission which is accepting applications for two appellate court 
vacancies; and a federal suit is challenging the Commission’s authority. 
The Judicial Evaluation Commission continues to release recommendations 
                                                
 19. Authority of the Governor to Fill Judicial Vacancies, supra note 17. 
 20. Tenn. Exec. Order No. 34 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/executive_order_no._34.signed.10.16.13_2.pdf. 
 21. Complaint, Moncier v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-00630-TAV-HBG (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 
18, 2013). 
 22. Tom Humphrey, Evaluation Commission Recommends Against New Terms for 
Three Appeals Court Judges in Preliminary Vote, KNOXBLOGS.COM (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://knoxblogs.com/humphreyhill/2013/10/31/evaluation-commission-recommends-new-
terms-three-appeals-court-judges-preliminary-vote. 
 23. Chas Sisk, Judge Jerry L. Smith Says He Won’t Seek Re-election, THE 
TENNESSEAN (Dec. 6, 2013), republished at http://www.lawreport.org/ViewStory.aspx? 
StoryID=12885. 
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that will shape the face of judicial elections immediately prior to the vote 
on the constitutional amendment. In short, there are a lot of open questions 
as the State approaches elections and a constitutional referendum next year. 
The authors intend for this Article to function, in part, as historical 
overview. This necessarily incorporates some legal analysis, as Tennessee’s 
constitutional dictates have played no small part in the State’s sojourn into 
merit selection. The constitutionality of Tennessee’s merit selection 
process, the effectiveness and desirability of merit selection, and the impact 
of campaigns (and campaign finance) on the judicial system are just a few 
areas addressed. In the spirit of the Symposium for which this Article has 
been prepared, however, the authors’ main endeavor is to present editorial 
comments and personal reflections on judicial selection in Tennessee in 
conjunction with the historical overview. Author Margaret L. Behm has 
been extensively involved in the judicial selection process in this State for 
more than thirty years. Thus, the second part of this Article is relayed in 
first person. 
B. Historical Background, 1796–1970 
Tennessee became a state in 1796.24 Its first Constitution did not 
provide for a fully independent Judicial Branch of government. Rather, the 
Superior Court and lower courts were created by and subordinate to the 
Legislature. Many observers decried the defective nature of the judicial 
system, and the Legislature revamped the court structure several times in 
the early period of Tennessee history.25 
The State’s second Constitution was adopted in 1835.26 For the first 
time, it established the independence of the judiciary, with the judicial 
power of the state “vested in one Supreme Court” and such inferior courts 
as established by the General Assembly.27 The Supreme Court consisted of 
three judges—one from each Grand Division of the State.28 Judges of courts 
of law and equity were appointed jointly by the General Assembly for a 
term of eight years.29 County courts were presided over by Justices of the 
                                                
 24. Tennessee history buffs might be interested to know that Tennessee’s short-lived 
predecessor, the State of Franklin, rejected a constitutional scheme that provided for a 
system of local “arbitration” of personal disputes, complete with peremptory strikes. 
FRANKLAND CONST. of 1785, § 37, available at http://www.tn.gov/tsla/founding_docs/ 
33664_Transcript.pdf; see also Tennessee’s Founding and Landmark Documents, TENN. 
VIRTUAL ARCHIVE, http://teva.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/tfd/id/ 
225 (noting that this constitution was rejected). 
 25. James W. Ely, Jr., Law in Tennessee, TENN. ENCYC. OF HIST. AND CULTURE (Dec. 
25, 2009), http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entry.php?rec=768. 
 26. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 504 (citing SAMUEL C. WILLIAMS, PHASES OF 
THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 5 (1944)). 
 27. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1834); White & Reddick, supra note 7 at 504. 
 28. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1834). 
 29. Id. § 3. 
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Peace and Constables, who were directly elected by their local 
constituents.30 
In 1853, the Constitution was amended to provide for the election 
of Supreme Court judges.31 Professor White and Dr. Reddick call this a 
“purely political” happenstance.32 As they describe it, in 1849, United 
States Congressman Andrew Johnson and Democratic Governor William 
Trousdale began advocating for a popularly elected judiciary based on their 
belief that the otherwise dominant Tennessee Whig party “would oppose 
any change” that would reduce the Whig’s power.33 Johnson then “co-
opted” the media into the debate, reframing the issue as whether 
government officials questioned the public’s competency to select their 
own judges.34 Thus, cross-party support was gathered, an 1851 legislative 
resolution to amend the Constitution was supported by both gubernatorial 
candidates, and, in 1853, “the voters approved the amendment which 
provided that the ‘Judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the 
qualified voters of the State.’”35 
After the Civil War, Tennessee adopted its third and still-governing 
Constitution in 1870. The language of the 1853 amendment was retained, 
with an additional provision empowering the Legislature to prescribe rules 
to carry out the provisions of the constitutional article creating the 
Tennessee Supreme Court. No similar provision was adopted to empower 
the Legislature to prescribe rules relative to the election of circuit, 
chancery, or inferior court judges,36 again evidencing the Legislature’s 
unwillingness to deny itself the power to “tinker” with the appellate 
judiciary of the State.37 
Not to be overlooked in any examination of Tennessee politics 
(and, hence, Tennessee law) are the Grand Divisions of Tennessee. The 
Tennessee Blue Book describes the Divisions in geographic terms—
”upland, often mountainous, East Tennessee, Middle Tennessee with its 
foothills and basin, and the low plain of West Tennessee.”38 Tennessee’s 
Official Historian, the late Walter T. Durham, asserted that the “grand 
                                                
 30. Id. § 15. 
 31. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 506 (quoting TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (as 
amended in 1853)) (citing Lewis L. Laska, The Tennessee Constitution, in TENNESSEE 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER STATE 9 (John R. Vile & Mark 
Byrnes eds., 1998)). At this time, the Tennessee Supreme Court was the only continuing 
court with appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 508. 
 32. Id. at 505. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 506. 
 35. Id. (quoting TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (as amended in 1853)). 
 36. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 507. 
 37. “[T]he Tennessee practice of frequent legislative tinkering with the judiciary was 
begun early in the state’s political life.” Id. at 507 n.47 (quoting LEWIS L. LASKA, TENNESSEE 
LEGAL RESEARCH HANDBOOK (1977)). 
 38. Tenn. Sec’y of State, A History of Tennessee, TENN. BLUE BOOK (2011–2012) 471, 
available at http://www.state.tn.us/sos/bluebook/11-12/TS1_AHistoryOfTennessee.pdf. 
2014] JUDICIAL SELECTION IN TENNESSEE 151 
division distinction is more geographical and cultural than political, and in 
each division the culture changes with the geography.”39 
With all due respect to Mr. Durham, the Grand Divisions may trace 
their differences to geography and culture, but these differences certainly 
play out politically. They are even defined statutorily.40 An examination of 
the State’s Grand Divisions and their political histories and legacies is 
fascinating but beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say Tennessee’s 
politics have, from the very beginning, been influenced by the Divisions, 
with multiple constitutional provisions explicitly referencing them. Indeed, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court is required to convene in each of the three 
Grand Divisions, and no more than two justices can reside in any one Grand 
Division.41 The importance of the Grand Divisions is also reflected 
repeatedly by statute, confirming Durham’s assertion that “State lawmakers 
have left [Tennesseans] the legacy of three states in one . . . .”42 The next 
changes to the appellate judiciary would come a century later, but the 
importance of the Grand Divisions would remain. 
1. The Rise of Merit Selection, Circa 1971     
In 1971, the Tennessee General Assembly acted to place all 
appellate courts under a version of the “Missouri Plan” of merit selection.43 
The Appellate Court Nominating Commission was created,44 and for the 
first time, the entire appellate judiciary in the State became subject to merit-
based selection and retention elections. 
The Commission represented the General Assembly’s attempt at 
creating a “non-political” appellate judiciary.45 As illustrated in Figure 1, it 
consisted of nine members, none of whom were allowed to be state or 
federal employees or hold office in any political party or organization.46 
Three members were gubernatorial appointees, representing each Grand 
                                                
 39. Walter T. Durham, Tennessee Heritage, THE COURIER, June 2005, at 4, available 
at http://www.tn.gov/environment/history/docs/courier_jun05.pdf. 
 40. The Tennessee Legislature has enacted laws declaring that there are three Grand 
Divisions of the State: the Eastern, Middle, and Western and has specified the counties of 
which each Grand Division is comprised. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-201–204 (1836). 
 41. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 42. Durham, supra note 39, at 4. 
 43. Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, a nonpartisan judicial commission 
reviews applications, interviews candidates and selects a judicial panel from which the 
governor fills the vacancy. Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, YOUR MO. CT., http://www. 
courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=297 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). Judges are subject to 
nonpartisan retention elections, and an evaluation commission issues public reports to 
inform the electorate of the judge’s performance. Id. Missouri’s plan for merit-based 
selection and retention of judges has been a model for over thirty states. Id. 
 44. 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts 641 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-701 (repealed 
2009)). 
 45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-701(1) (repealed 2009). 
 46. Id. 
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Division. No more than one of these three could be an attorney.47 Three 
additional members of the Commission, one from each Grand Division, 
represented the bar and were elected by a referendum of attorneys. Finally 
three members were from the General Assembly and elected via joint 
session, with at least one member required from each tribunal.48 
Figure 1–Appellate Court Nominating Commission 
 
The preamble to the legislation declared that the “purpose and 
intent” of the Act was: 
to assist the Governor in finding and appointing the best 
qualified persons available for service on the appellate 
courts of Tennessee and to assist the electorate of 
Tennessee to elect the best qualified persons to said courts; 
to insulate the justices and judges of said courts from 
political influence and pressure; to improve the 
administration of justice; to enhance the prestige of and 
respect for the appellate courts by eliminating the necessity 
of political activities by appellate justices and judges; and, 
to make the appellate courts of Tennessee ‘non-political.’49 
                                                
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 488 (Tenn. 1973). 
Composition of Membership 
9  
Members 
3 
3 3 
Appellate Court Nominating Commission 
Established by 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts. ch. 198. 
Gubernatorial Appointees 
Representing each Grand Division 
No more than 1 attorney 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties or organizations 
General Assembly Members* 
At least 1 from each tribunal  
May or may not be attorneys 
Elected by Joint Session 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties or organizations 
*Ruled unconstitutional by State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973). 
“No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be eligible to any office or 
place of trust, the appointment to which is vested in the Executive or the General Assembly . . . . ”  
TENN. CONST. art II, § 10. 
Attorney Self-Selection 
Representing each Grand Division 
Elected by referendum of attorneys 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties or organizations 
Goal: “Non-Political Appointments 
(Former Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-701(1)) 
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The Act provided for the application process, nomination process, 
appointment process, and subsequent election process of the appellate 
judiciary. Every eight years, appellate judges were required to file a written 
declaration of candidacy. Thereafter, their names were placed on the ballot 
with the question “Shall (Name of Candidate) be elected and retained in 
office as (Judge) of the (name of Court)?” A majority vote in favor of re-
election resulted in the candidate being issued a certificate of election.50 
2. First Constitutional Challenge, 1972 
It was not long before politics found its way into this new non-
political nominating process. On June 19, 1972, Tennessee Supreme Court 
Judge Larry Creson passed away six weeks before the end of his term on 
August 31, 1972.51 Governor Winfield Dunn gave notice to the Appellate 
Court Nominating Commission, and the Governor was provided with a 
three-name panel from which to choose a successor. Governor Dunn then 
announced that nominee Thomas F. Turley, Jr. would fill the vacancy, 
beginning September 1, 1972.52 
In the meantime, the State’s regular biennial elections were held on 
August 3, 1972. Even though the Governor had not issued writs of election 
to place the judicial office on the ballot, attorney Robert L. Taylor 
conducted a write-in campaign for the vacancy on the court.53 The 
Governor’s Office responded with a statement declaring that Mr. Taylor 
was ineligible for the position.54 Gubernatorial decree notwithstanding, Mr. 
Taylor received 3,301 votes to Mr. Turley’s 555, and Mr. Taylor declared 
himself the winner of the election.55 
On August 18, 1972, the Secretary of State issued Mr. Taylor a 
Certificate of Election.56 The Governor subsequently issued Mr. Turley a 
commission appointing him Justice of the Supreme Court from September 
1, 1972 until September 1, 1974, “until he shall have been elected and 
retained in office.”57 Mr. Taylor responded by taking the oath of office. The 
District Attorney became involved via a quo warranto action. In addition to 
determining the matter of who was entitled to the judgeship, the Davidson 
County Chancery Court was asked to address the constitutionality of the 
Act creating the Appellate Court Nominating Commission.58 
                                                
 50. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 509–10. 
 51. N. Houston Parks, Judicial Selection—The Tennessee Experience, 7 MEM. ST. U. 
L. REV. 615, 615 (1976–77) (discussing the facts surrounding the merit selection plan for 
filling vacancies on the appellate courts). 
 52. Higgins, 496 S.W.2d at 482. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 482–83. 
 58. Id. at 482. 
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Chancellor Frank Drowota59 determined that neither man was 
entitled to the office and declined to rule on the constitutionality of the 
Appellate Court Nominating Commission.60 The Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial court’s analysis, essentially stating that the Governor only had 
the power to make an appointment to fill the unexpired term, and the 
appointee could have then been retained by election.61 However, since the 
necessary prerequisites were not met for a contested election, the write-in 
candidate was similarly unentitled to the office.62 
The Court went on to address the constitutionality of the Appellate 
Court Nominating Commission and determined that the three General 
Assembly members who held seats on the Commission could not do so, as 
“No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was 
elected, be eligible to any office or place of trust, the appointment to which 
is vested in the Executive or the General Assembly . . . .”63 The Court held, 
however, that the Act as a whole survived constitutional review and that the 
retention election was a constitutionally permissible method of fulfilling the 
requirement of judicial elections.64 
In his dissent, Justice Humphreys addressed the expressed 
legislative intent of depoliticizing the courts and opined that the scheme 
behind the Appellate Court Nominating Commission was inherently 
political—more so than direct elections could ever be: 
We are today witnessing a sad consequence of this 
subordination of this Supreme Court to the Legislature. 
Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that a bill has been 
introduced in the Legislature to repeal the Modified 
Missouri Plan. This bill may be defeated. But, that need not 
be the end of it. Another bill can be introduced next 
session, or the session after that, ad infinitum, so that 
Supreme Court Judges and, possibly, all judges, can be 
kept in attendance by the Legislature, hat in hand, so to 
speak, whenever it suits the purpose of some disgruntled 
representatives to snap the Court to attention with a bill to 
change the manner of their election. If this is not 
subordination, nothing is. If this is not more political than 
election by the people, nothing is. Have we not, like Esau, 
                                                
 59. Chancellor Drowota would be elected to the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1980. 
See Chief Justice Drowota Retiring from Supreme Court, TNCOURTS.GOV (June 6, 2005), 
https://www.tncourts.gov/press/2005/06/06/chief-justice-drowota-retiring-supreme-court. 
 60. Higgins, 496 S.W.2d at 482. 
 61. Id. at 491 (“We hold that the Governor was without power to appoint Mr. Turley 
to the term to which he appointed him. We therefore overrule his assignments of error and 
dismiss his appeal.”). 
 62. Id. at 487. 
 63. Id. at 490 (quoting TENN. CONST. art. II, § 10). 
 64. Id. at 490–91. 
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sold our precious birthright, equality and freedom for a 
mess of potage, a cheap, easy way to be perpetuated in 
office? I say this Court has opened Pandora’s Box, and, 
that although the evils locked up therein may not surface 
immediately, and in fact may never surface, there is no 
longer any constitutional guarantee that they cannot, as was 
the case before the majority opinion was written.65 
In challenging judicial selection by raising the question of whether 
a “retention election” is an “election,” those who oppose merit selection 
created a diversion that recurs to this day. Scholars have pointed out that 
there really is no question.66 The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the 
question in Higgins, but that would not be last word on the subject. The 
“retention election” question still simmers. 
3. Second Iteration of Merit Selection—The Return of Statewide Elections 
for the Supreme Court, 1973 
With the General Assembly’s first attempt at eliminating politics 
having achieved mixed results at best, the Legislature went back to work 
and revised the composition of the Appellate Court Nominating 
Commission. Less than two months after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Higgins (and a mere month after the Court’s order on rehearing declaring 
that the Governor could move forward to appoint the still-existing vacancy 
on the Court), the General Assembly modified the composition of the 
Appellate Court Nominating Commission.67 
The revised Appellate Court Nominating Commission had two 
additional members, for a total of eleven. The Governor’s influence was 
enhanced, as gubernatorial nominees were increased to four, with no more 
than two attorneys permitted in that group. In place of the three General 
Assembly members, each tribunal’s speaker was charged with appointing 
two members who may or may not have been attorneys, with no more than 
one representative from each political party. 
 
                                                
 65. Id. at 494–95 (Humphreys, J., dissenting). 
 66. See generally White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 527–29 (arguing that a retention 
election satisfies both the traditional definitions of the word “election” as well as the 
Tennessee Supreme Court’s construction of it). Indeed, one probably does a disservice to the 
jurisprudence by continuing to call it a “retention election” as if it differed in character from 
an “election.” 
 67. 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1027–30. 
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Figure 2–Revised Composition of Appellate Court Nominating Commission 
 
Less than one year after altering the composition of the Appellate 
Court Nominating Commission, the General Assembly again changed the 
Commission’s enabling legislation, this time removing the Supreme Court 
from its purview.68 Justice E. Riley Anderson described this turn of events 
as quid pro quo. “Democratic fears of a Republican governor making 
Supreme Court appointments combined with the desire of Upper East 
Tennessee Republicans for a medical school. The result: popular partisan 
elections for the Supreme Court and a medical school in Johnson City.”69 
Then-Governor Winfield Dunn vetoed the repealing legislation, 
noting the lack of principled basis for creating a two-tiered system of 
appointments to the appellate judiciary. If the modified Missouri Plan 
presented a good basis for appointments, it should be retained across the 
board. If it did not, then it should be repealed in its entirety.70 The General 
Assembly overrode the veto, and the seats on the Tennessee Supreme Court 
became subject to direct, statewide elections. This arrangement would not 
                                                
 68. 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 433. 
 69. Riley Anderson, Valerius Sanford, & Janet Leach Richards, A New Group Forms 
to Preserve Old Treasures: The Tennessee Supreme Court Historical Society, 33 TENN. BAR 
J. 12 (1997), available at http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/journal_archives/1997/ 
TBJ0397.pdf (quoting Justice Riley Anderson’s speech at the founder’s meeting). 
 70. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 512. Republican Dunn, who subsequently lost a 
gubernatorial bid in 1986, has recently claimed that signing the election retention scheme 
into law was a “mistake.” Tom Humphrey, Ex-Gov. Dunn Regrets Signing Appellate Judges 
Retention Law, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (July 21, 2013), http://www.knoxnews.com/ 
news/2013/jul/21/ex-gov-dunn-regrets-signing-appellate-judges-law/. 
Appellate Court Nominating Commission* 
As amended by 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 265 
Revised Composition of Membership 
*In 1974, Supreme Court seats were removed from the jurisdiction of the Commission. 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 433. 
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4 
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Attorney Self-Selection 
Representing each Grand Division 
Elected by referendum of attorneys 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties or organizations 
Gubernatorial Appointees 
Representing each Grand Division 
No more than 2 attorneys 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties or organizations 
House Speaker Appointees 
No more than 1 from the same political party 
May or may not be attorneys 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties or organizations 
Senate Speaker Appointees 
No more than 1 from the same 
political party 
May or may not be attorneys 
No state or federal employees 
No office holders of political parties 
or organizations 
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last long, however. 
C. The Tennessee Plan, 1994–2013 
By 1994, judicial selection was once again a hot topic, and the 
General Assembly overhauled the entire nomination process, disbanding 
the Appellate Court Nominating Commission and instituting in its place 
what would come to be known as the Tennessee Plan, anchored by the 
Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission.71 The new Commission would 
have fifteen members, with the Speaker of the House and Senate each 
making seven appointments and conferring to make one joint appointment. 
Nominations for the appointments would come from a variety of lawyer 
groups.  
Figure 3–Judicial Selection Commission72 
 
With the new Judicial Selection Commission, the goal of 
nonpolitical appointments was maintained,73 and the General Assembly also 
specifically recognized that lawyers are in the best position to evaluate 
                                                
 71. Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 942, § 3 (1994). 
 72. A 2001 revision to the Judicial Selection Commission statute added two members 
to the Commission, one to be appointed by each speaker. The new members were to be 
lawyers that were not affiliated with any of the specified groups identified in the statute. 
Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 459, §§ 4–8 (2001). 
 73. TENN. CODE ANN. 17-4-101(a) (2008) (amended 2009). 
Tennessee Judicial Nominating Commission 
Established by 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 517, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-101 et seq. 
Senate Speaker Appointees 
3 from Trial Lawyers Ass’n 
From each Grand Division 
3 District Attorneys 
From each Grand Division 
1 lawyer, not from a group 
(2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 459) 
1 non-lawyer 
House Speaker Appointees 
2 from Tennessee Bar Ass’n 
From different Grand Divisions 
No Personal Injury/Criminal Defense 
3 Ass’n Crim. Defense Lawyers 
1 from Tenn. Def. Lawyers Ass’n 
1 non-lawyer 
1 lawyer, not from a group 
(2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 459) 
1 non-lawyer 
Speakers 
consult to 
ensure 
practice area 
diversity. 
Goal: “Nonpolitical” Appointments. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-101(a). 
Means:  Lawyers are in best position to evaluate good qualities of judges. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-101(b). 
17 Members 
Statutory Mandate: Diversity   
shall reject the list.  
shall appoint persons who approximate the population of the state with respect to race and gender. 
 shall intend to select a commission diverse as to race and gender.  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-102(b)(2), (b)(3), (c). 
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good qualities in judges.74 The new legislation also brought with it a new 
statutory mandate: diversity. 
The diversity mandate included three requirements designed to 
encourage diversity among the members of the bench. First, nominees for 
membership on the Judicial Selection Commission were to “approximate 
the population of the state with respect to race and gender,” including 
representation from the “dominant ethnic minority population.”75 Thus, the 
various groups of lawyers were on notice to submit appropriately diverse 
panels for nomination to serve on the commission. Second, the speakers 
were required to reject any list of nominees that did not “reflect the 
diversity of the state’s population.”76 Third, the various groups involved, as 
well as the speakers, were given this ultimatum: “each group and speaker 
shall intend to select a commission diverse as to race and gender.”77 Unlike 
the Appellate Nominating Commission, there was no requirement of 
diversity regarding differing political party affiliations. 
Also key to the Tennessee Plan was the institution of the judicial 
performance evaluation program through which court personnel, lawyers, 
and other judges could evaluate the performance of Tennessee judges, with 
one goal the ability to assist the electorate by providing information that 
could promote informed retention decisions.78 
Figure 4–Judicial Evaluation Commission 
                                                
 74. TENN. CODE ANN. 17-4-101(b) (2008) (amended 2009). 
 75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (2008) (amended 2009). 
 76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(b)(3) (2008) (amended 2009). 
 77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(c) (2008) (amended 2009). 
 78. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 519–20. 
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3 3 
Tennessee Judicial Evaluation Commission 
Established by 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts. ch. 942, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-201. 
Judicial Council Appointees 
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Senate Speaker Appointments 
1 Tenn. Trial Lawyers Ass’n 
1 Tenn. Ass’n Crim. Def. Lawyers 
1 non-lawyer 
Statutory Mandate: Diversity 
“Each group and each appointing authority in making lists of nominees and appointments respectively, shall do so with a conscious intention of 
selecting a body which reflects a diverse mixture with respect to race and gender.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-201(b)(5). 
“In keeping with the intent [expressed regarding the diversity of the judicial selection commission], the appointing authorities and each nominating 
group for the judicial evaluation commission shall endeavor to make appointments and submit nominees respectively that approximate the population 
of the state with respect to race and gender.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-201(b)(7). 
House Speaker Appointees 
1 Tenn. Bar Ass’n 
1 Tenn. Ass’n Crim. Def. Lawyers 
1 non-lawyer 
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1. The Tennessee Plan Is Implemented and Legal Chaos Ensues79 
It may not have been Justice Humphrey’s proverbial “Pandora’s 
Box,” but two decades after Higgins, a Special Supreme Court was forced 
to acknowledge that the judicial selection system had resulted in “legal 
chaos.”80 In 1994, Governor Ned McWherter appointed Penny White to the 
Tennessee Supreme Court to fulfill the unexpired term of retiring Justice 
Charles O’Brien—who had been elected in 1990 prior to the enactment of 
the Tennessee Plan. In 1996, Justice White became the center of an 
upwelling of controversy regarding judicial selection. Her candidacy for the 
Supreme Court sheds light on the difficulties that can ensue when both the 
Justice and the method of selection are subject to frequent and simultaneous 
attack. 
Justice White’s appointment was subject to retention election on 
August 1, 1996. However, she was not reviewed by the Judicial Evaluation 
Commission prior to being placed on the ballot for election. This was 
apparently due to the belief on behalf of the State and the Judicial 
Evaluation Commission that subsequent to its creation by July 1, 1995, it 
was not required to conduct judicial evaluations until judicial candidates 
were standing for complete terms, which would not occur until August 
1998.81 Indeed, this belief likely came from the language of the statute 
itself: “The judicial evaluation program, including the public report and the 
ballot information, shall apply to each appellate court judge who seeks to 
serve a complete term after September 1, 1994.”82 However, others took the 
position that the overall construction of the Tennessee Plan provided that no 
appointed judge could have his or her name placed on a retention ballot 
without having first been evaluated by the Commission, and, indeed, at 
least one appellate judge in the State who was slated to stand for election 
after having been appointed to an unexpired term repeatedly and 
unsuccessfully requested evaluation by the commission.83 
Operating on the argument that no judge could appear on a 
retention ballot without having first been evaluated, attorneys Lewis Laska 
and John J. Hooker each sought to declare their candidacy for the statewide 
election in early 1996. The State Coordinator of Elections declined to 
provide them with nominating positions, noting that Justice White would be 
running unopposed on the ballot in a retention election. Both sued, and their 
                                                
 79. See State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331, 345 (Tenn. 1996) (“We 
take judicial notice that following the issuance of our orders in these cases something 
approaching legal chaos ensued.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 340. 
 82. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 17-4-201(e) (1996) (amended 2009)). 
 83. “The Evaluation Commission appears to have taken the position that ‘any action in 
furtherance of speeding up an abbreviated and unapproved election process would in fact 
undermine the goals, objectives, and overall integrity of the program.’” Lillard v. Burson, 
933 F. Supp. 698, 700 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (quoting Commission Memo, May 13, 1996). 
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suits were eventually consolidated for review by a Special Supreme Court 
since the sitting Justices recused themselves on a matter regarding their 
own election. 
The Special Supreme Court agreed that the Tennessee Plan 
required Justice White to be evaluated by the Commission prior to standing 
for election by retention ballot. In the absence of such an evaluation, the 
Special Supreme Court essentially held that a statewide contested election 
was required but that no candidates had validly qualified for election prior 
to the deadline.84 The Special Supreme Court gave Justice White 
dispensation to file belatedly for candidacy and ordered that Hooker could 
not be placed upon the ballot because he failed to meet the necessary 
requirement, as his law license had lapsed. The Court also eventually 
ordered that Mr. Laska’s name could not be placed on the ballot under state 
law because Justice White was appointed to fill the unexpired term of 
Justice O’Brien, and his vacancy must be filled by a resident of the same 
Grand Division as he. While Justice White met the residency requirement, 
Mr. Laska did not. The Court allowed John King, the putative Republican 
candidate for the office held by Justice White, to file an amicus curiae brief. 
He was ultimately granted an extension of the qualifying deadline so that he 
would have the opportunity for his name to be placed on the ballot, should 
the matter have ultimately proceeded to a contested election.85 
In its final opinion on the matter, the Special Supreme Court 
concluded “that the yes/no retention vote provided for in the Tennessee 
Plan is in compliance with the Article VI, Section 3 mandate of the 
Tennessee Constitution that Judges of the Supreme Court be ‘elected by the 
qualified voters,’” adding that “[n]o authority was cited by any party to 
these proceedings, nor has any been found by this Court, that would dictate 
a different result under the United States Constitution.”86 The Special Court 
further found that neither Article I, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution, 
requiring elections to be “free and equal,” nor Article II, Section 1 of the 
Tennessee Constitution, providing for the separation of powers among the 
three branches, were in conflict with the terms of the Tennessee Plan.87 
Meanwhile, two federal court cases addressing the August 1996 
judicial elections were filed and consolidated. Several appellate judges, 
including Justice White, asserted a property right to a retention election as 
bestowed by the Tennessee Plan’s statutes and by the assurances of State 
officials made to her regarding the official status of her candidacy. Hooker 
countered that the Special Supreme Court’s ruling required a contested 
election. Ultimately, the federal district court determined that Justice White 
                                                
 84. See Hooker v. Burson, 960 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (characterizing 
the holding in Thompson, 249 S.W.3d at 346). 
 85. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d at 335–36. 
 86. Id. at 338. 
 87. Id.; see also Hooker v. Haslam, 393 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Tenn. 2012) (characterizing 
the holding of Thompson, 249 S.W.3d at 338). 
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was entitled to appear on a retention ballot. Thus, the retention elections 
were ordered to proceed.88 The federal court left undisturbed the Special 
Supreme Court’s ruling that the General Assembly was empowered to 
dictate the manner of judicial elections in the State. 
While the litigation surrounding her retention election was ongoing, 
Justice White also became the subject of an aggressive campaign against 
her retention in which she was portrayed as opposing the death penalty. 
Professor Bright describes the situation succinctly. In addition to a political 
hit piece mailed by the Tennessee Conservative Union, 
[t]he Republican Party also mailed a brochure to voters 
entitled, Just Say NO! with the slogan, “Vote for Capital 
Punishment by Voting NO on August 1 for Supreme Court 
Justice Penny White.” Inside, the brochure described three 
cases to demonstrate that Justice White “puts the rights of 
criminals before the rights of victims.” It described the case 
of Richard Odom as follows: “Richard Odom was 
convicted of repeatedly raping and stabbing to death a 78 
year old Memphis woman. However, Penny White felt the 
crime wasn’t heinous enough for the death penalty—so she 
struck it down.” 
Neither mailing disclosed that Richard Odom’s case was 
reversed because all five members of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court agreed that there had been at least one legal 
error which required a new sentencing hearing. The court 
affirmed Odom’s conviction and remanded his case for a 
new sentencing hearing. No member of the court expressed 
the view that the crime was not heinous enough to warrant 
the death penalty. Indeed, the remand for a new sentencing 
hearing at which a jury would decide between the death 
penalty and life imprisonment made it quite clear that the 
court did not find the death penalty inappropriate for 
Odom. Justice White did not write the majority opinion, a 
concurring opinion, or a dissenting opinion. Yet Tennessee 
voters were led to believe that she had personally struck 
down Odom’s death penalty because she did not think the 
crime was “heinous enough.” 
White’s opponents also blamed her for the fact that 
Tennessee has not carried out any executions in the last 
thirty-six years. But the Odom case was the only capital 
case which came before the Court during White’s nineteen-
                                                
 88. Lillard, 933 F. Supp. at 704–05. 
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month tenure. Tennessee’s political leaders did not call 
attention to this distortion; instead, Tennessee’s governor 
and both its United States Senators, all Republicans, 
opposed White.89 
Ultimately, Justice White became the first and only appellate judge 
in Tennessee to be removed from office due to losing a retention vote.90 
The election was held after the Special Supreme Court had issued its orders 
in the matter, but prior to the final issuance of its opinion. In the meantime, 
the Tennessee Attorney General had issued its opinion that the new vacancy 
on the Court could be filled by residents of either the Eastern or the 
Western Grand Division, since each of those divisions was then represented 
by only one Justice. The Special Supreme Court took judicial notice of the 
post-judgment fact of Justice White’s defeat and, deeming the Attorney 
General’s opinion erroneous, determined that “the ‘at large’ vacancy 
created by the resignation of Justice O’Brien [and the subsequent defeat of 
Justice White91] must be filled by a resident of the Eastern Grand Division, 
the Grand Division in which the vacancy originally occurred.92 
The Judicial Selection Commission thus proceeded to accept 
applications only from residents of the Eastern Grand Division.93 Janice 
Holder, a resident of the Western Grand Division of the State who was then 
a circuit court judge in Memphis, sought a declaratory judgment that the 
vacancy on the Tennessee Supreme Court could be filled by applicants 
from either the Eastern or the Western Grand Divisions.94 Ultimately, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the question of the Grand 
Division residency of the new justice had not properly been before the 
Special Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then ruled that the Tennessee 
Plan and the State Constitution were in harmony, and applicants from both 
the Eastern and Western Divisions must be considered. Eventually, Judge 
Holder secured appointment to the bench. 
The Tennessee Bar Association responded to these events by 
creating a task force to study judicial selection.95 It would later decide to 
continue backing merit selection, as it had since 1987.96 
                                                
 89. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid 
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 308, 314–15 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 90. Mark Pickerell, Bench Presses: Judicial Reform, a Year After Penny White, 
NASHVILLE SCENE (Oct. 30, 1997), http://www.nashvillescene.com/nashville/bench-presses/ 
Content?oid=1181693. 
 91. At this point, your authors would suggest to those who maintain that elections via 
retention ballot are not “elections,” that if there was no “election,” then what did the voters 
do to cause Penny White to no longer be on the Court? 
 92. State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331, 346 (Tenn. 1996). 
 93. Holder v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tenn. 1996). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Hon. J. Daniel Breen, President’s Perspective, 32 TENN. BAR J. (1996), available 
at http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/journal_archives/1996/TBJ1196.pdf. 
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2. A Decade Later, a New Controversy Erupts 
Within a few years, the political landscape in Tennessee would 
begin to change. In 2007, Ron Ramsey became Tennessee’s Lieutenant 
Governor, the first Republican to hold such office in more than 140 years. 
The Lieutenant Governor is the Senate Majority Leader and serves as the 
Speaker of the Senate.97 Lieutenant Governor Ramsey made clear his 
distaste for having legal interest groups dictate his nominees to the Judicial 
Selection Commission.98 Not long after, Governor Bredesen, who in his 
tenure would have the opportunity to appoint four Supreme Court Justices, 
entered into a very public dispute with the Selection Commission. 
In 2006, two Supreme Court Justices announced their retirement, 
including Tennessee’s second African-American Supreme Court member, 
Justice Aldopho A. Birch, Jr., 99 and the only African-American Justice who 
had ever been elected to the office.100 After the only African American on a 
three-name panel selected by the Commission withdrew from consideration 
for the position, the Governor rejected the remaining panelists and asked for 
a new panel, one that included “qualified minority candidates.”101 The 
Commission responded by tendering a new panel that consisted of one 
African-American and two Caucasian males.102 One of the Caucasian men 
had been on the previously rejected panel. 
The Governor filed suit, arguing that the Commission could not 
return the name of a rejected panelist.103 Eventually, a Supreme Court 
comprised of three Justices (one a Bredesen appointee) and a Special 
Justice determined that the second panel was void for having contained the 
name of a previously-rejected applicant and that the Commission was to 
                                                                                                             
 96. Dan L. Nolan Jr., President’s Perspective, 34 TENN. BAR J. (1998), available at 
http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/journal_archives/1998/TBJ0198.pdf. 
 97. Methods of Election, Team Election Data for the Office of Lieutenant Governor, 
Nat’l Lt. Governors Assc. (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.nlga.us/lt-governors/office-of-
lieutenant-governor/methods-of-election/. 
 98. See Richard Locker, Lt. Governor Ramsey Offers New Plan on Supreme Court 
Elections, THE COM. APPEAL (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/ 
2009/apr/19/official-offers-new-judge-03/. 
 99. Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., to Retire After 43 Years of Judicial Service, 
TNCOURTS.GOV (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.tncourts.gov/press/2006/01/26/justice-
adolpho-birch-jr-retire-after-43-years-judicial-service. 
 100. Justice George Brown, Jr. was appointed by Governor Lamar Alexander in 1980 to 
fill the last few months of the late Justice Joe Henry’s unexpired term. He ran in the general 
election in that year as a Republican and was defeated by Democratic nominee Frank F. 
Drowota. Carl A. Pierce, The Tennessee Supreme Court and the Struggle of Independence, 
Accountability, and Modernization, 1974–1998, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME 
COURT 270, 276 (James W. Ely Jr., ed., 2002). 
 101. Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 421–23 (Tenn. 
2007). 
 102. Id. at 422. 
 103. Id. at 423. 
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tender a new panel.104 
The episode again brought statewide attention to the idea of merit 
selection and drew new scrutiny surrounding the idea of diversity on the 
bench. Moreover, the brouhaha resulted in the decision of the General 
Assembly to allow the Judicial Selection Commission to sunset105 and 
threatened the very existence of merit selection in Tennessee. Eventually, a 
one-year solution was adopted that overhauled the composition of the 
Judicial Selection Commission, renaming it the Judicial Nominating 
Commission. The revised application process was overseen by the State’s 
Administrative Office of the Courts but allowed the Speakers of the House 
to choose anyone they like to serve on the JNC—even persons who forego 
the application process.106 
Figure 5–Tennessee Judicial Nominating Commission 
 
The 2009 legislation retained merit selection for Tennessee until 
June 30, 2012, but it did not retain a key provision of the former system. 
Gone was the explicit recognition that lawyers are the best judges of judges. 
While lawyers still made up the majority of the JNC, the language 
explaining their presence was eliminated, and the ratio of lawyers to non-
lawyers was decreased. As a response to Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial 
                                                
 104. Id. at 439–41. 
 105. Sunset for the TJSC, THE COM. APPEAL (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.commercial 
appeal.com/ news/2009/apr/15/sunset-for-the-tjsc/. 
 106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(d) (2009). 
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Selection Comm’n, the Governor was given the explicit right to request a 
second panel of three nominees and the ability to appoint from among any 
of the six total names that might be submitted for his consideration.107 
Also notably changed was the law’s take on the importance of 
diversity. Where in the past speakers were required to reject nominee panels 
that were not diverse, there was no longer such a requirement. Instead, the 
general assembly simply retained the instruction that speakers must have a 
conscious intention to create a diverse commission. The definition of 
diversity was expanded, with an additional aspect of diversity 
acknowledged—diversity with respect to “representation of rural areas as 
well as urban centers.”108 
In perhaps the most honest change reflected in the law, the 
language making court appointments “nonpolitical” was eliminated; the 
articulated goal was simply “to make the courts less political.”109 The 
realization that nothing in a democracy is ever truly nonpolitical is perhaps 
the only point upon which everyone involved can agree. 
 
 
Figure 6–Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission 
 
                                                
 107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112(a)(1) (2009). 
 108. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(c)(3) (2009). 
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Under the new law appellate judges were subject to a judicial 
evaluation process, but the Commission’s composition was strikingly 
different. The previous version of the Commission had four lawyers (from 
four different lawyer groups, each of which has a regular presence in the 
state courts), four non-lawyers, and four judges. The new Commission 
eliminated the direct input of the lawyer groups. And, whereas previously 
the Tennessee Judicial Council (a group of lawyers, judges, and non-
lawyers110) could appoint state court judges to serve on the evaluation 
commission, the new Commission called for the appointment of judges 
directly by the Speakers of the House and Senate.111 
Additionally, the General Assembly allowed the Tennessee Judicial 
Council to sunset effective June 30, 2009. Thus, the organization created by 
the General Assembly through which “judges, chancellors, public officers, 
members of the bar and others” could have an official mechanism to make 
reports and recommendations as to legislation affecting the administration 
of justice,112 was officially disbanded, leaving the bench, bar, and general 
public without a voice in the General Assembly with which they could 
make meaningful comment on the status of justice in the State. It is hard to 
interpret this move to silence the voice of the judiciary as anything other 
than another step by the General Assembly to subrogate the judiciary and 
diminish its effectiveness. 
3. A Sea Change in Tennessee Politics 
Between 2009 and 2013, the political landscape surrounding 
judicial selection saw radical shifts. In January 2011, for the first time since 
Reconstruction, the Tennessee General Assembly convened in Nashville 
with a Republican majority in both houses.113 It was not long before the 
107th General Assembly of the State of Tennessee began the process of 
repealing the Tennessee Plan. 
A flurry of legislative proposals followed. Just two weeks into the 
legislative session, a bill was introduced to abolish the Tennessee Plan in 
favor of contested elections for all appellate judges.114 Another similar bill 
was introduced the following month.115 Additional proposals included 
allowing the governor the opportunity to appoint a judge even if that judge 
was not on the list of the Selection Commission’s nominees,116 and a 
requirement that appellate judges be retained by a margin of 75% of votes, 
                                                
 110. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-21-101 (2002). 
 111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b) (2009). 
 112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-21-107 (2002). 
 113. Judy M. Cornett & Matthew R. Lyon, Contested Elections as Secret Weapon: 
Legislative Control over Judicial Decision-Making, 75 ALB. L. REV. 2091, 2092 (2012). 
 114. H.B. 0173, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
 115. H.B. 0958, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
 116. H.B. 1017, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
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rather than a majority.117 Additionally, a proposed constitutional 
amendment providing for gubernatorial appointment of appellate court 
judges subject to Senate confirmation was introduced but did not move 
forward.118 
Lieutenant Governor Ramsey responded with a proposed 
constitutional amendment that incorporated the statutory Tennessee Plan 
into the body of the State’s Constitution, apparently to alleviate lingering 
fears that retention elections were, in fact, unconstitutional.119 This proposal 
was supported by Republican Governor Bill Haslam and Republican House 
Speaker Beth Harwell. One reason the bill was proposed was ostensibly to 
insulate the appellate judiciary from the negative ramifications of injecting 
judicial political campaigns with the complications of campaign finance, as 
corporate campaign contributions became legal in Tennessee effective June 
1, 2011.120 
The General Assembly broke with its leadership, however, and 
charged on, eventually consolidating its efforts toward a constitutional 
amendment to require gubernatorial appointments subject to approval of the 
entire Legislature, with periodic retention elections—the proposed 
amendment discussed at the beginning of this Article. Since proposed 
constitutional amendments must be presented in two consecutive sessions, 
the proposed amendment was presented and approved in 2012 and 2013 
and will appear on the ballot in November 2014. 
D. Back to the State of Play: Where Are We & Where Should We Be 
Going? 
As to where we are now, there is much uncertainty. Justice Holder 
announced her retirement without a system in place to fill her vacancy. 
Governor Haslam has created his own Commission for Judicial 
Appointments based upon an Attorney General Opinion interpreting a 
                                                
 117. H.B. 1702, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). This bill was arguably a 
veiled attempt at simply eliminating retention elections, as historically, appellate judges have 
tended to secure retention with less than 75% of the vote. Indeed, the fact that the judges 
were not generally retained by a supermajority indicates that the electorate is not simply 
giving judges a “free pass” at election time. 
 118. S.J. Res. 0475, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
 119. Tom Humphrey, Haslam, Harwell, Ramsey Unite Behind Judge Selection Plan, 
THE KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/ 
jan/25/haslam-harwell-ramsey-unite-behind-judge-plan/; see Cornett and Lyon, supra note 
113, at 2092–93. Again, the unfounded specter of unconstitutionality has permeated the 
judicial selection debate and served to steal focus from more fruitful lines of inquiry 
regarding the “best” method of selection. See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as 
Appointment: The Tennessee Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2008) (providing a 
history of the prolific litigation regarding the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan and 
arguing that the Plan is unconstitutional). 
 120. See Candidate FAQs, Bureau of Ethics and Campaign Finance, http://www.tn.gov/ 
tref/cand/cand_faq.htm#17 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
168 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1: 143 
repealed statute, and the new Commission is already the subject of federal 
litigation. At this point, it appears that the voters will be asked to vote on a 
constitutional amendment for the selection of appellate judges without 
knowing for certain what system they are replacing. In addition, because 
the proposed constitutional amendment on the November 2014 ballot only 
addresses appellate judges, the system for filling the vacancies for trial 
judges remains uncertain. There are many opportunities to set off new 
rounds of “judicial chaos.” 
If the proposed constitutional amendment passes, Tennessee’s 
system of appointed appellate judges will resemble the federal system in 
that the executive’s discretion to choose a nominee will be subject to the 
willingness of both houses of the Legislature to confirm the nominee. Of 
course, with defined terms rather than lifetime appointments, the 
opportunities for appointment (and legislative deadlock) will be more 
frequent. The extent to which the federal system of merit appointments can 
be considered a good model in the post-Bork era is a debate for another 
day. The proposed amendment may well end the debate of judicial selection 
in Tennessee regarding appellate judges. As set forth above, however, it 
does not solve many aspects of the problem, and, in fact, it leaves a gaping 
hole, particularly as to the trial courts. 
As this Article demonstrates, Tennessee’s courts have always faced 
the threat of subrogation from the General Assembly and have frequently 
been used as pawns in the political process. This is likely not unique to our 
State; after all, the country’s Founders noted that “all possible care” must 
be taken to prevent the judiciary from being “overpowered, awed, or 
influenced” by the other branches of government.121 One need only look at 
the six graphs in this Article for a pictorial representation of how, in just the 
last forty years, the General Assembly has frequently wielded its influence 
to “decide ‘the deciders.’” And now, the proposed constitutional 
amendment would make the Legislature the ultimate “decider” of all 
appellate judges. 
The question of who “decides ‘the deciders’” impacts the 
administration of justice in ways that go beyond articulation. And it is 
justice that is the end-all and be-all.122 Lawyers have long played a pivotal 
role in the process of serving justice. The Preamble to the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “a lawyer 
should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of 
law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional 
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their 
                                                
 121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 425–26 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 289 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“Justice 
is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be 
pursued until it be obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”). 
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authority.”123 Thus, today, as in the past, lawyers must work within 
whatever system they have—especially when there is “legal chaos”—to 
secure the best judiciary. 
II. PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUDICIAL SELECTION IN TENNESSEE 
Margaret L. Behm has been extensively involved in 
Tennessee’s judicial selection process for more than three 
decades. This Section relates a firsthand account of her 
personal experiences with the judicial selection process in 
this State. 
A. The Face of the Tennessee Judiciary, 1976–2013124 
In 1976, when I graduated from law school, I knew nothing about 
judicial selection except what I knew about the U.S. Constitution and the 
selection of federal judges. Nothing in my law school education prepared 
me for the impact and importance of the selection of state judges. What I 
did notice immediately, however, was that none of the judges were women. 
At that time, Tennessee had one female judge serving on a court of record, 
who was appointed to the bench in 1975.125 My involvement in the process 
                                                
 123. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope ¶ 6 (2013), available at 
http://pards.org/main/AmericanBarAssociation(ABA)ModelRulesofProfessionalConduct 
(DOC,201KB).doc. 
 124. For additional information, please see Mary Wood, Women Stronger Than Ever in 
the Judiciary, Panel Says, U. OF VA. SCH. OF L. (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.law.virginia. 
edu/html/news/2003_fall/women_judiciary.htm; Ken Whitehouse, Kurtz Retiring, 
NASHVILLE POST (Jan. 14, 2008), http://nashvillepost.com/news/2008/1/14/kurtz_retiring; 
Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey 68 Honored with Distinguished Service Award, VAND. L. 
SCH., http://law.vanderbilt.edu/donor/distinguished_service.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); 
Chancery Court, Part I, http://trialcourts.nashville.gov/portal/page/portal/trialCourts/judges/ 
ClaudiaBonnyman/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); Law’s History, LAWYERS ASS’N FOR 
WOMEN, http://www.law-nashville.org/LAW%27s%5FHistory/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); 
Rose P. Cantrell, http://www.visalaw.com/Parker/rpc.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); David 
C. Rutherford, Criminal Court History, http://trialcourts.nashville.gov/portal/page/portal/ 
trialCourts/history/ourHistorySubPages/criminalCourtHistory (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); 
Cornelia A. Clark, TENN. STATE CT., https://www.tncourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/judges/ 
cornelia-clark (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); Sharon G. Lee, TENN. STATE CT., https://www. 
tncourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/judges/sharon-g-lee (last visited Feb. 25, 2014); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b)(6)(2012); Haslam Appoints Holly M. Kirby to Tennessee Supreme 
Court, THE CHATTANOOGAN (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.chattanoogan.com/2013/12/17/ 
265742/Haslam-Appoints-Holly-M.-Kirby-To.aspx; Geert De Lombaerde, Haynes Stepping 
Down from Bench, NASHVILLE POST, (Sept. 12, 2011), http://nashvillepost.com/news/2011/ 
9/12/haynes_stepping_down_from_bench. 
 125. That judge was Martha Craig “Cissy” Daughtrey, now Senior Judge of the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Prior to her 1995 appointment to the Sixth Circuit, Judge 
Daughtrey had never held a job for which she was not the first woman ever to hold the 
position. She was the first female Assistant U.S. Attorney in Nashville, the first female 
District Attorney in Nashville, and the first female professor at Vanderbilt Law School 
before she made history as the first woman judge of a court of record in Tennessee. 
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of judicial selection over the past thirty-seven years has been fueled by my 
desire to change the face of justice in Tennessee. 
My legal career began shortly after the institution of merit selection 
with retention elections for the intermediate appellate courts and during the 
era of statewide, head-to-head elections for state Supreme Court justices. At 
that time, local trial judges were elected in contested races, with mid-term 
vacancies filled by gubernatorial appointment without any merit selection 
screening. 
I began my practice at Legal Services of Middle Tennessee,126 in 
Nashville, as a University of Tennessee graduate in a town where there 
were few opportunities for women lawyers and fewer opportunities for 
women who were not at the top of Vanderbilt Law School’s class with good 
family and business connections. At Legal Services I learned first-hand 
what an impact lawyers could make, not only to assist those with limited 
resources, but also to make changes in systems that needed change. 
I had been out of law school for just over a year when a coalition of 
Nashville lawyers decided to address the quality of representation of 
criminal defendants rendered by the local public defender’s office. This 
coalition of determined, idealistic lawyers crossed gender and political lines 
and worked together in 1978 to elect Walter Kurtz, a former Legal Aid 
Director, as Nashville, Davidson County’s public defender.127 Through this 
process, I got to know lawyers committed to using their influence to affect 
the political process. I also got my first taste of how to run a countywide 
campaign. 
This kicked off a period during which I was intensely involved in 
politics and judicial elections. By 1980, I had left Legal Services and started 
with Marietta Shipley the first female law firm in Nashville, Shipley & 
Behm. Meetings that brought about the organization Lawyers Association 
for Women (“LAW”) in 1981 occurred in our law office.128 
Most of my political activity occurred with the help of lawyers who 
are women. In one respect, my lawyer friends and I did not do anything 
particularly unusual; we just figured out how the system worked, and then 
worked within the political system. In other words, our focus was not so 
much on which system was better or which system resulted in a more 
diverse judiciary—we simply worked within the system to create a better 
judiciary.129 
                                                
 126. Now the Legal Aid Society of Middle Tennessee and the Cumberlands. 
 127. Walter Kurtz was elected four years later as a Davidson County Circuit Judge and 
later served as a Senior Judge until he retired in August 2013. 
 128. Claudia Bonnyman, now Davidson County Chancellor, was LAW’s first President 
and Aleta Trauger, now Federal District Judge of the Middle District of Tennessee, was 
LAW’s second President. 
 129. These women include Barbara Haynes, Cissy Daughtrey, Marietta Shipley, Connie 
Clark, Jeanie Nelson, Mary Shaffner, Claudia Bonnyman, Aleta Trauger, and Susan 
McGannon. 
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By 1982, no woman had ever run in a contested countywide 
judicial election in Nashville, but the face of the judiciary was about to 
change. Barbara Haynes took the challenge to run against a General Session 
judge and became the first woman to beat an incumbent in any countywide 
Davidson County race.130 Having gained experience in Walter Kurtz’s race, 
I ran her campaign. Also in 1982, Muriel Robinson won a contested trial 
court judgeship in Davidson County for an open seat. Elsewhere in the 
State, Julia Gibbons, who had worked as legal counsel for Governor Lamar 
Alexander and been appointed by him at age thirty to fill an unexpired term 
on the circuit court bench in Shelby County, Tennessee, won her seat in the 
1982 elections.131 
With judicial elections every eight years, in order to make any 
significant headway in the intervening years, gubernatorial appointments to 
the bench were key. By 1988, there had been only one other woman 
appointed as judge,132 so a meeting was sought with Governor Ned Ray 
McWherter. I participated in this meeting with the Governor and Deputy 
Governor Harlan Matthews along with Connie Clark and Jeanie Nelson133 
to discuss the appointment of women to the bench. Our message was 
simple: only four women in the history of our State had been appointed by a 
governor to courts of record.134 I have no way of knowing if this meeting 
had any impact, but within the next year, two women were appointed to the 
trial bench. Governor McWherter appointed Mary Beth Leibowitz to the 
Criminal Court in Knox County on February 15, 1989. On October 1, 1989, 
he appointed Connie Clark to the Circuit Court of Williamson, Perry and 
Hickman Counties, and she became the first female judge of a court of 
record in Tennessee’s rural counties.135 The next year in 1990, I ran the 
campaign of my law partner Marietta Shipley, who defeated an incumbent 
for election to the Davidson County Circuit Court bench. 
While the face of the bench was beginning to change at the trial 
court level, Judge Daughtrey remained the sole appellate judge who was a 
woman. As for the Tennessee Supreme Court, statewide elections were in 
                                                
 130. Eight years later, Barbara Haynes was elected to a Circuit Court judgeship, where 
she served until she retired in 2011. 
 131. Gibbons was married to Alexander’s campaign manager of the state’s largest 
county. She later became a Federal District Court Judge before now serving on the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Rose Cantrell, also appointed by Governor Alexander to the 
Circuit Court of Davidson County, lost her seat to Walter Kurtz in the 1982 election. 
 132. Ann Lacy Johns, now Filer, was appointed on April 28, 1987 by Governor Ned 
Ray McWherter to the Criminal Court of Davidson County. 
 133. Jeanie Nelson later became General Counsel of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency and is now President and Executive Director of the Land Trust of 
Tennessee. 
 134. Judge Daughtrey in 1975 by Governor Blanton, Judges Gibbons in 1991 and 
Cantrell in 1992 by Governor Alexander, and Judge Johns in 1987 by Governor McWherter. 
 135. Connie Clark was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court in 2005, elected in 
2006, and in 2010, she was sworn in as the second woman in history to serve as Chief 
Justice. 
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place for nominees of political parties for the Court, and with the next 
judicial election in 1990 approaching, several of us turned our attention to 
changing the face of our highest court. At that time, the Democratic Party 
was the only party to submit a slate, and thus the Democrat nominees were 
always elected.136 The key was to get the Democratic nomination. 
In 1990, the Executive Committees of each party determined the 
nominees to the Supreme Court seats. Since at least 1972, the Executive 
Committees for the party were comprised of one man and one woman from 
each of the State’s sixty-six senate districts.137 Thus, the equal number of 
women as gatekeepers or decision-makers was encouraging for a woman 
candidate. Knowing that this opportunity comes only once every eight 
years, a coalition was built around the candidacy of Judge Daughtrey. Due 
to the requirement that no more than two Justices could reside in the same 
grand division, Judge Daughtrey faced a choice of which Justice’s seat to 
seek in the Middle Grand Division. She decided to campaign for the seat 
occupied by Justice William Harbison, a respected justice who was elected 
to the Supreme Court in 1974. 
Judge Daughtrey traveled extensively throughout the state, meeting 
with executive committee members and asking for their support. This was 
no easy feat, for Judge Daughtrey traveled by herself at night, before the 
days of cell phones, to find the homes of committee members, many of 
whom lived in isolated rural areas. Tennessee is a large state, with Memphis 
being closer to Dallas, Texas, than Mountain City, Tennessee—the state’s 
easternmost county seat.138 In the end, Judge Daughtrey attributed much of 
her success to her willingness to go meet people in their homes and 
specifically ask for their support.139 She was chosen by the Executive 
Committee as one of its five nominees. 
After failing to secure his party’s nomination, Justice Harbison 
resigned in March 1990.140 Thereafter, Judge Daughtrey was appointed as 
the first woman on the Supreme Court by Governor Ned McWherter to fill 
Justice Harbison’s remaining term. When the Republicans fielded no 
opposition to the Democratic slate in the August 1990 election, Judge 
                                                
 136. Pierce, supra note 100, at 277. 
 137. See 1972 Pub. Acts ch. 740, § 1. Formerly § 2-1304; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-
103. Both national political parties have some form of gender balance requirement among 
their committees. See Lisa Schnall, Comment, Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic 
Party Equal Division Rule, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 384 (2005) (“The 
Democratic and Republican Parties, as well as select states, have long required gender-
balanced national or state committees.”). 
 138. Part Ten, Things That Surprise People, http://www.tnhistoryforkids.org/ 
geography/a_10 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 139. Interview with Judge Daughtrey as part of the oral history collection of the 
Women Trailblazers in the Law, a project of the American Bar Association, Commission on 
Women in the Profession (May 20, 2008). 
 140. Pierce, supra note 100, at 306. 
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Daughtrey became the first woman elected to the Tennessee Supreme 
Court. 
The efforts to change the face of the judiciary also included a look 
at the all-male Appellate Court Nominating Commission. We determined 
the timing of appointments and proposed women to the Governor and 
Speakers for appointment when a term expired. The Speakers appointed 
two women, including Holly Lillard.141 As for the lawyer positions, every 
two years an election among lawyers was held from one of the Grand 
Divisions. In 1991, I ran and won a seat as the representative for the Middle 
Grand Division, and two years later, a woman won from the Western Grand 
Division. By 1994, four of the eleven members were women, Holly Lillard 
served as Chair, and we saw a sharp increase in woman applicants for 
intermediate appellate judgeships. 
However, in 1994, there was a move to change the system for 
selecting judges. Justice Aldolfo A. Birch, Jr. was up for election after 
having been appointed by Governor McWherter in December 1993, and his 
supporters worried that an African-American could not win a statewide 
contested election. Lieutenant Governor Wilder had long supported an 
enlarged role for merit selection and wanted to pass such legislation as his 
legacy. The Supreme Court was led by Chief Justice Lyle Reid, an advocate 
of retention elections for the Supreme Court. Governor McWherter, a 
Democrat who was term limited, was completing his second term, and 
because it was unknown whether a Democrat or Republican would succeed 
him, both parties were receptive to instituting a system that would allow a 
Governor to appoint trial and Supreme Court judges, in addition to 
intermediate appellate judges, by a merit selection process. 
I had the opportunity to be involved in the crafting of the Tennessee 
Plan, and as with most pieces of legislation this broad in scope, there were 
hard-fought battles on many fronts and tricky, intriguing political 
bedfellows. My particular focus was to mandate diversity in the statutory 
language. It had taken a long time to get representation on the Appellate 
Court Nominating Commission. We had seen the benefits of diverse 
gatekeepers with the Supreme Court nomination of Justice Daughtrey. 
The proposed statute required particular lawyer groups, such as the 
trial lawyers and the district attorneys, to submit names for appointment, 
which had few women in leadership positions. We knew it would be tough 
to have women as appointees from these gatekeepers. Our coalition 
proposed that a diversity mandate be included as part of a consensus 
                                                
 141. Holly Lillard, now Holly M. Kirby, served on the Appellate Court Nominating 
Commission from 1989–1994. She was appointed by Governor Don Sundquist in 1995 as 
the first woman to serve on the Court of Appeals. In November 2013, she was nominated by 
the Governor’s Commission on Judicial Appointments to fill the vacancy on the Tennessee 
Supreme Court caused by the retirement of Justice Janice Holder. In December 2013, 
Governor Bill Haslam appointed her to the Supreme Court, effective after Justice Holder’s 
retirement on August 31, 2014. 
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amendment to the bill supported by Lieutenant Governor Wilder. Even 
though our group was working with the lawyer groups to draft a consensus 
amendment, we learned just hours before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
meeting that the “consensus” bill did not contain this diversity language. 
Senator Joe Haynes sponsored another amendment to require diversity on 
the basis of gender and race according to the population of the State. It 
passed in Committee, and on the night the bill was to be considered on the 
floor of the Senate, Lieutenant Governor Wilder called me and asked me to 
withdraw the amendment stating that he thought it would defeat his 
signature legislation. We did not withdraw the amendment, and it passed. 
This time our amendment was part of the consensus amendment when the 
House passed it. Therefore, the Tennessee Plan contained a statutory 
mandate of diversity with respect to gender and race, with a directive to the 
Speakers of the General Assembly that the nominees to the Commission be 
rejected if the panel was not diverse as to race and gender.142 
In 1994, with the Tennessee Plan in place, I was proposed as a 
member of the Judicial Selection Commission by the Tennessee Bar 
Association and appointed to the Commission by House Speaker Jimmy 
Naifeh. I was elected by the Commissioners as the Commission’s first 
Chair. At that time, we had fifteen members, seven of whom were women 
and three African-Americans. Within the next ten years, two more women 
were appointed to the Supreme Court and three women were appointed to 
the intermediate appellate courts. Tennessee’s second-ever African-
American was appointed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Diverse 
representation in the trial courts in Davidson County increased with the 
appointment of Ellen Lyle as Chancellor in 1995, Cheryl Blackburn as 
Criminal Court Judge in 1996, and in 2003, Monte Watkins as Criminal 
Court Judge and Claudia Bonnyman as Chancellor. 
While the face of the judiciary continued to change during that 
time, so did the face of the Judicial Selection Commission. Although the 
Speakers followed the statute with their appointments at the outset, the 
legislation did not have a remedy if appointments were not made pursuant 
to the directives of statute. Despite language that they “shall intend” to 
create a diverse Commission and that they “shall” reject panels of nominees 
that lacked such requirement, as Commissioners vacated their positions, the 
statutory mandate for diversity with respect to gender and race was not 
followed by the Speakers. By the time I left the Commission ten years later, 
there were only three women out of the then seventeen members, and I was 
the only white woman. In the end, the Speakers did not like the diversity 
requirement and chose not to follow it. When the Judicial Nominating 
Commission was substituted for the Judicial Selection Commission in 2009, 
the diversity mandate was not included, although the appointing authorities 
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to the revised Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission were instructed 
to make appointments that approximated the population of the state with 
respect to race and gender. As of its conclusion in the summer of 2013, the 
Judicial Nominating Commission consisted of fourteen white men, two 
white women, and one African-American woman. For each opening of the 
three intermediary appellate positions it considered, the Commission sent 
two panels to the Governor in case he elected to reject the first panel. No 
women appeared on the first choice list of panels for any of the openings.143 
The only women to appear on any panels were three women who together 
comprised the back up “Panel B” for the Middle Section Court of Appeals. 
The governor made his selections from the first-choice “Panel A.” All three 
appellate court appointments made in August 2013 were white men. 
B. Thoughts on Moving Forward 
With the state of judicial selection in confusion, the question arises 
as to what is the best way to select judges in Tennessee. I have been 
involved in over one hundred judicial selection processes. Most involved 
my tenure on the Judicial Selection and Appellate Court Nominating 
Commissions. I have also managed election campaigns for trial court and 
Supreme Court judges. I have served on selection panels for federal 
magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges and was appointed by the U.S. 
Court for the Sixth Circuit to chair the Merit Selection Panel in 2011 for the 
appointment of bankruptcy judge for the Middle District of Tennessee. 
Each process is different and involves different persons to serve as 
gatekeepers and “deciders” of judges. 
In Tennessee, unlike the federal system, the voters are ultimately 
the deciders. As for trial court judges, the system with a merit screening 
process for vacancies from 1994 through the summer of 2013 was a good 
one. This system encouraged applicants from all walks of life to apply for 
vacancies and built confidence in the judiciary. Facing the voters in their 
communities every eight years has served the system well, and even though 
elections cost money, the cost of elections thus far for these seats has been 
manageable. 
In my opinion, the best system for the selection for the intermediary 
appellate courts was the method of selection under the Appellate Court 
Nominating Commission from 1973 to 1994. Both Speakers of the General 
Assembly had appointees, as did the Governor. Lawyers from each Grand 
Division could run for election, and the statute required the appointment of 
commissioners who were not lawyers. Most importantly, appointees of the 
Speaker and Governor had to be from differing political parties. This 
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process assured representation from all constituencies and built confidence 
that partisan politics was not steeped in the process. Regarding the filling of 
vacancies on the Supreme Court, in my opinion the previous Appellate 
Court Nominating Commission system would have best served filling its 
vacancies. 
As for the elections of all appellate judges, the system of coupling 
the election by retention with screening by the Judicial Evaluation 
Commission brought about in 1994 was the best system to date. In this 
system, a form of merit screening took place. For those who disagree with 
the previous Supreme Court decisions that elections by retention satisfy the 
constitutional requirement for election by the voters, it is hard for me to 
understand how one categorizes what happened to Justice White. I was 
there with others a couple of months before her election in 1996, trying to 
ascertain how best to help Justice White deal with the surprise, negative 
media attacks. Justice White was voted out of office by the voters. If that 
was not an election, what was it? 
Whatever the system, one that encourages diversity, as does merit 
screening, is paramount. In deciding Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection 
Commission, the Supreme Court described how essential it is that the bench 
(and bar) represents the faces of the community.144 This same idea was 
specifically expressed by the General Assembly in 1994 when it declared 
that both the Judicial Selection Commission and the appellate bench itself 
should reflect the faces of Tennessee. It bears considering, then, the extent 
to which merit selection actually does result in a diverse bench. Long-time 
Selection Commissioner (and intervener in the Bredesen case) Buck T. 
Lewis suggested that merit selection, by removing the need for political 
connections, gives anyone a chance at a judgeship.145 Data from around the 
country supports this view,146 as does my experience in Tennessee. 
In the twenty years under the Tennessee Plan, the appointments 
through April 2013 were sixty-nine percent men and thirty-one percent 
women. Nine percent of those appointed were members of minority groups. 
Tennessee saw the first-ever majority-women Supreme Court with its first-
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ever female Chief Justice147 succeeded by another female Chief Justice. 
Two women and one African American serve on the twelve-member Court 
of Appeals, and two women sit on the twelve-member Court of Criminal 
Appeals, with one of those women being the first African-American woman 
to serve on an intermediate appellate court in Tennessee. Prior to merit 
selection for replacing trial bench vacancies between elections in 1994, 
there had been eight women serve as state trial court judges. As of April 
2013, there were twenty-six female trial court judges and nine minorities 
out of 152 such judges.148 
As Tennessee faces the specter of statewide judicial elections in 
August 2014, two unknowns are on the horizon. First, how will money 
shape the elections? Tennessee has not seen statewide judicial elections in 
the post-Republican Party of Minnesota v. White149 and post-Citizens’ 
United150 era. As prescient as Justice Humphreys’s 1973 comments151 
regarding judicial elections might have been, even he simply could not have 
contemplated the huge amount of resources that are now used to fund 
elections in this country, and the extent to which judicial candidates are 
allowed to discuss election issues. 
Second, in light of these new “freedoms” to campaign with money 
and political stances, how will statewide elections play out in a state that 
now has only one other contested statewide election for a state office? 
Tennessee elects its Governor on a statewide ballot, but the Lieutenant 
Governor and other constitutional offices are selected by the Legislature 
and the Attorney General is selected by the Supreme Court. Questions also 
remain as to whether the results of the August 2014 statewide judicial 
elections will impact the public’s November 2014 vote on the proposed 
constitutional amendment. 
We do not yet have answers to these questions. If the proposed 
constitutional amendment passes, will the General Assembly institute a 
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merit screening process to occur prior to the Governor’s appointment? Will 
the Legislature give due deference to the Governor’s appointment or 
politicize further the process in its role as the ultimate “decider,” which 
could discourage potential applicants? If the proposed constitutional 
amendment fails, what system will the Legislature enact to ensure that this 
equal branch of government is properly selected? With the proposed 
constitutional amendment only dealing with appellate courts, is merit 
selection screening for trial courts to remain subject to the individual policy 
determination of the Governor? Or will the Legislature resurrect it? 
The General Assembly (or the people, via constitutional 
amendment) has the prerogative to pick the manner of judicial selection. 
They should do so with a merit selection screening system. The real lesson 
from over thirty years of experience is that judicial selection, so vitally 
important to the public at large, ultimately depends on a system that 
encourages good lawyers to put themselves forward for such crucial 
positions. At the present in Tennessee, no such system is in place. 
POSTSCRIPT 
This Article was presented in draft form as part of Belmont College 
of Law’s Inaugural Symposium. Since then, the issue of judicial selection 
in Tennessee remains a source of continuing news and uncertainty. As of 
the final revisions to this Article, the Special Supreme Court has issued an 
opinion in Hooker v. Haslam holding that the election of judges to the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals and Court of Criminal Appeals on a statewide 
basis did not violate the constitutional requirement that judges be elected by 
the qualified voters of the districts.152 Regarding whether election on a 
retention ballot satisfied the constitutional requirements of an election, the 
Court determined that while it could dispose of the matter on the basis of 
stare decisis, it had elected to undertake an independent review examining 
particular facets of the issues that had not been part of the analysis in prior 
cases. Based upon its independent analysis, the Court determined that the 
retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan passes constitutional 
muster because the plain meaning of “election” was satisfied and because 
“elective offices in Tennessee do not depend upon opposition from another 
candidate, but upon whether the office is filled by the direct exercise of the 
franchise of the voters.”153 
While Hooker v. Haslam may have been settled, many other 
matters remain outstanding. The Evaluation Commission made preliminary 
votes recommending the replacement of three intermediate appellate 
judges, subsequent to which one judge on the Criminal Court of Appeals 
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announced his retirement.154 Another Tennessee Supreme Court Justice 
announced his retirement effective at the end of his term in August 2014,155 
the result of which is that the Governor’s Commission on Judicial Selection 
has been involved in the appointment of two of the five Supreme Court 
seats during the pendency of both the legal challenges and constitutional 
amendment referendum regarding merit selection. Both of those Supreme 
Court appointments resulted in intermediate appellate court judges being 
elevated to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and this created two additional 
judicial vacancies to be addressed by the Governor’s Commission.156 
Further, a new lawsuit was filed, arguing that because the 
Evaluation Commission did not reflect the diversity in its membership 
required by statute, it was an “invalid” commission.157 The trial court judge 
agreed that the Commission was discriminatory and invalid, but the court 
did not enjoin the Commission from meeting.158 The Commission, with 
advice from the Attorney General’s office, then met notwithstanding the 
order regarding its validity, and, in split votes, revised its recommendations 
as to the two appellate judges it had previously determined should not be 
recommended for retention.159 Meanwhile, Governor Bill Haslam (a 
Republican) and his predecessor Phil Bredesen (a Democrat) announced the 
formation of an alliance to campaign for the passage of the pending 
constitutional Amendment.160 And, while Tennessee faces the specter of 
electoral uncertainty in judicial campaigns, the United States Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC, which the Washington Post 
has referred to as the “sequel” to Citizens United.161 In light of the 
continually-shifting landscape, the only certainty at this point is that 2014 is 
poised to be a watershed year for the issue of judicial selection in 
Tennessee. 
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